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ABSTRACT
Thispaper considers the problem of hiring scientists for research
and development projects when one takes explicit account of the fact that
the scientist may be able to use the information acquired during the
project in a rival enterprise. Management's problem is to determine an
optimum labor policy for its project. The policy consists of an employment
decision and a labor contract. Given optimum behavior, it is straightforward
to analyse the effect of the potential for mobility of scientific personnel
on project profitability and on research employment. We also formalize
conditions under which one would expect to observe a scientist leaving his
employer to set up (or join) a rival.
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ISRAELOPTIMUM CONTRACTS FOR RESEARCH PERSONNEL, RESEARCH EMPLO1ENT, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF 'RIVAL' ENTERPRISES*
However, no amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly
appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information.
The very use of information in any producti.véway is bound to
reveal it, at least in part. Mobility of personnelamong firms
provides a way of spreading information.
Arrow (1962, p. 615)
At least since the work of Schumpeter (1942) economists havestressed
the fact that the private rate of return to researchresources (and hence
research employment) is determined, in part, by the degree to whicha
firm can maintain proprietary rights (monopoly power)over the information
produced in its research laboratories. Given the rapid increase in
industrial research expenditures since World War II and theincreasingly
convincing empirical evidence on their impact, it is a bit disconcerting
that so little work has been done on how firmsfacing this appropriability
*Weare greatly indebted to Morris Teubal for his insights into the
problems discussed here, and to the participants in seminars at the
Hebrew University, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the
University of Toronto, and the University of Chicago. AriI Pakes
acknowledges the financial assistance of BSF Grant 1881/79 and
NSF Grant PRA79-l374O and SOC78—04279.-2-
problem ought to behave. That is, howshoulda firm act in order to protect
its innovations? and how does the action it takes affect research demand
and the structure of science-based industry?
One frequently cited mechanism for the spread of the information
produced in industrial research laboratories is the mobility of scientific
personnel. It is not a difficult mechanism to explain. Research projects
often require a good idea and substantial investments before they produce
an output which can be embodied in a marketable good or service. The output
of the project is a new piece of information which has no (or a very low)
cost of reproduction; and any scientist working on the project is likely
to be at least as aware of this information as the management. The
scientist can therefore wait until the information has been developed and
then decide to leave and use it in a rival enterprise. Indeed (as will be
discussed below) there are many well-documented cases of scientists leaving
their employers to set up or join a rival.
This paper develops optimum labor policies for research personnel
when management takes explicit account of the fact that a scientist has
the option of leaving the firm to join a rival. We then consider the
implications of these policies on project profitability, research
employment, and the establishment of rival firms. The labor policy consists
of an employment decision and a labor contract. The problem of determining
an optimum labor contract for research personnel is a particular example
of the principal's problem in the theory of agency (for a general
description of the principal's problem, see Ross, 1973). It is closely
related to Becker and Stigler's (1974) discussion of appropriate
compensation schemes for law enforcers when malfeasance is possible (see
also Harris and Raviv, 1978, and Lazear, 1979; articles by Nickell, 1976,-3-
Salop and Salop, 1976, and Mortensen, 1978, consider the relationship
between alternative causes of employer-employee separation and labor
contracts). The implications of the labor contract which are particularly
interesting in this context are those related to project profitability
and research employment. The determination of the level of research
employment in market economies is an issue which has been extensively
discussed in the literature. The discussion has centered on the question
of whether the public-good characteristics of the output of research
activity leads to under (or over) investment in research resources (see
Arrow, 1962, Barzel, 1968, and Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). Although
we focus on only one of several mechanisms which can potentially spread
the information produced in research laboratories--the mobility of
scientific personnel--we analyse it in some detail. In particular, we
shall consider how other aspects of appropriability are likely to affect
our results, and we can formalize the conditions under which the potential
mobility of scientists should lead to the establishment of a rival.
Section I describes the entrepreneur's basic problem. In Section II
we provide an optimum labor policy, discuss how it can be implemented,
and analyse some of its implications. Since the conclusions of Section II
are somewhat surprising, Sections III and IV consider how they are
modified by changes in the assumptions underlying the model; in Section III
we consider cases where institutional constraints render the optimum labor
contract unfeasible; Section IV considers changes in the model of the
research and marketing process which have a substantive effect on our
results, The paper concludes with a brief summary.—4-
I.THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
Consideran entrepreneur with an idea which could lead to a successful
innovation. To develop it into a marketable product, resources must be
committed to a research project. The outcome of the project will be known
after a single period. The period after the project is completed (the
second period) will be used to market its output. Initially, assume that
the only costly resource employed in the project is a scientist. At the
end of the project he will possess information which enables him, if he so
desires, to market the new information himself. As a result, the
entrepreneur realizes that no matter what the project's technical outcome,
at least two different market situations could arise. If the scientist
does not leave the firm to set up (or join) a rival enterprise, the
entrepreneur's firm may monopolize the information that resulted from the
project. Alternatively, if the scientist sets up a rival, there will be
at least two firms with the information. In this section we assume that
these are the only two market situations that can arise. That is, either
a single firm or two rivals will market the output from the project.
The entrepreneur's objective is to maximize the expected profits from
the project. He can choose the skill level, say s, of the scientist he
will employ. Given s, a series of exogenous events (associated with
the realization of a particular state of nature) will determine the
project's outcome. Let ER (R isthesetofrealnumbers) bea randomvariable
indicating the possible states of nature, and denote by G(c) the
distribution function which embodies the entrepreneur's prior beliefs
about the likelihood of the alternative states of nature. For any
E R let f(, s) be the net revenues to be generated by the project,
when the scientist chosen has skill level s and if he does not set up-5-
a rival after the project is completed. We assume that f(c, s)is
finite andnon-negative for all and s.1 A scientist who does not set
up a rival has two alternatives, He can either stay with the firm or
return to the labor market to engage in some other activity. To simplify
the analysis we assume that if he should decide to stay with the firm
during the second period the entrepreneur can always employ him in some
other activity in which his marginal productivity equals his alternative
wage.2 If, on the other hand, the scientist does set up (or join) a rival, let
the entrepreneur's net revenues he f(c, s) -2(E,s), where j(,s),
the loss due to the establishment of the rival, is assumed to be non-
negative and finite for all c and s.
In order to hire a scientist, management specifies a labor contract,
which is assumed to consist of a flat wage, w0(s), to be paid before the
realization of ,anda bonus payment, w(c, s), which is paid in the
second period and need therefore only be paid if the scientist decides to
stay with the firm. Thus, for any s, a labor contract is a couple
consisting of a number, w0(s), and a random function, w1(E, s). The
choice of the triple {s, w0(s), w(, s)} is referred to as a labor
policy.
That is, if the net revenues to be generated from marketing the output
were expected to be negative, the firm would simply not market that
output. Note that 'net revenues' is used to denote the sales minusthe
costs incurred during the marketing period. 'Profits' refers to these
net revenues minus the costs of the research project.
2Asimilar assumption (constant marginal productivity over time) is used
in most of the literature on labor turnover and quits; see the discussion
in Nickell (1976) or in Salop and Salop (1976).It simplifies the
analysis considerably by allowing one to abstract from the effect of
possible changes in the future demand for employees on current employment
decisions.-6-
Consider now the behavior of scientists of different skill levels.
The wages they can receive in alternative places of employment are set by
the labor market and are an increasing function of their skill. We
normalize s so that it equals these alternative wages and assume
S E [0, J= U.It is assumed that scientists choose their place of
employment by maximizing a utility function which is linear in the money
income they receive, that is, scientists are expected-payment maximizers.3
A scientist who becomes interested in the project is on inquiry informed
of the terms of the contract. These terms include the probability
distribution of the bonus [i.e., of w1(E, s) or, as would seem more
likely, that of f(, s) and its relationship to w1(c, s); see the
next section]; they also include the stipulation that the bonus will be
Allowing for risk aversion complicates the problem significantly without
changing the basic thrust of the argument presented here. The source of
the complication is that if the scientist is risk averse there will, in
general, be a contract which is slightly more complicated than the
contracts in the set {w0(s), w1(, s)} which is superior to all contracts
in that set. Broadening the set of possible contracts complicates the
technical formulation of the problem. See also note 7 below.
Thus if the distribution of w1(, s) is approximately normal the
scientist is told so and provided with its mean and variance. In a
broader framework one would also ask whether the entrepreneurcould, by
providing the scientist with the wrong distribution function, increase
expected profits. It can be shown that provided the scientist does not
have sufficient information on the distribution of f(E, s) from other
sources (say, from the stock market or from a community of people involved
in science-based industry who have considered similar projects in the
past), and provided nothing else in the problem changes as a result of
the entrepreneur's actions, the entrepreneur could increase hisexpected
profits by persuading the scientist of an overly optimistic distribution
function (see Section IV). In this case, however, otheraspects of the
Fhlem are likely to change. In particular, the entrepreneur is likely4- -7-
paid only if the scientist decides to stay with the firm during the second
period. The scientist is aware of the fact that by joining the project
he will acquire information of potential value, and he realizes that it
may not be in his interest to stay for both periods.If he does in fact
join, he will face three alternatives at the end of the first period. He
can stay and obtain the bonus, w1(, s). Alternatively, he can try to
capitalize on the information he has acquired by setting up or joining a
rival. To evaluate this possibility the scientist uses his knowledge of
science-based industry and the information he has been given on the
project to compute the possible pay-offs from using the information he has
acquired on the project in a rival enterprise, say p(, s). Assume that
if the scientist does join (or set up) a rival he receives p(€, s) plus
the market value of his labor during the second period s [all that is,
in fact, required is for the amount the scientist earns in a rival to be
less than or equal to p(s, s) +s].Finally, deciding that neither of
these alternatives is particularly attractive, the scientist may return
to the labor market to engage in another activity and earn the going rate
on his skill level,s.Being an expected-payment maximizer, he will
accept the bonus and stay with the firm if A ={w(c,s)
max[p(, s) +s,s]}. He will quit to set up a rival if Q =
towant to hire additional scientists later and they are not likely to
believe in an entrepreneur who has cheated before. Moreover, the
scientist may realize that he has been cheated early on in the project
and leave before its completion. Similar issues arise in much of the
literature on labor contracts (see, for example, Lazear, 1979) and we
assume, as is customary, that the considerations outlined above induce
the entrepreneur to reveal the correct information. A deeper analysis
of this issue may, however, be warranted.-8-
{c(p(c,s)+s>max[w(c,s), s]}; and if c E R -A-Q hewill
return to the labor market.5 Clearly, then, a scientist of skill level
s will only accept the offer to join the project if w0(s) +Ajwl(E,
s)dG +
f[p(E,s) +s]dG+s JdG2 2s, that is, if the expected payments
R-A-Q
from joining the project are at least equal to the payments he would
receiveover the two periods in alternative employment (for simplicity we
shall ignore discount factors).
The economic structure of theproblem set out in this section suggests
one more constraint (Section IV differs in this respect). If the
scientist's evaluation of p(c, s) and the entrepreneur's beliefs on
(s, s) are at all close to the gains the scientist would actually make
from setting up a rival and the entrepreneur's consequent losses,
respectively, wewould expect p(, s) -2(6,s)0. The difference
between p(c, s)and 9(c, s) is likely to be a result of two factors:
the additional costs incurred if a rival is set up, and the fact that post-
project competitive behavior is likely to divert to consumers some of the
gains that would otherwise accrue to the monopolist. Thus, the sum of the
gains that would accrue to the two agents in a situation involving rivalry
could never exceed those that would accrue in the monopolistic situation.
This would be true even if neither of them incurs any additional costs as
a result of the rival appearing. The rival, however, is likely to incur
some start-up costs, and he must also be able to circumvent any legal
and institutional mechanisms which give the entrepreneur some degree of
protection on the innovations emanating from his own research laboratories.
Let B and C be two sets. To simplify the notationwedenote the
union of B and C when B and C are disjoint by B +C;and
the set of all elements in B which are not contained in C, by B-C.-9-
These may include the costs of 'patenting around' entrepreneur's patents,
or simply the costs of advertising and product differentiation [in this
context the appearance of a rival may also induce theentrepreneur to
increase his expenditures and this would also tend to reduce
p(, s) 9(E,s)].Although, as we show in the next section, the condition
that p(E, s) - s)0 is sufficient for our purposes, we begin by
restricting the problem further and assuming that s)ctf(, s) for
o￿ct ￿1,and p(c, s) =ctf(c,s) -c(s).Here, if the scientist sets
up a rival, the entrepreneur loses a fraction n of the net revenues that
he would otherwise have obtained. The scientist,on setting up or joining
a rival, gains all these net revenues but must incurset-up costs, c(s) ￿O.
We can now formalize the entrepreneur'sexpected-profit maximization
problem.
Problem A
max II RjEs)dG -w0(s)
-A'(c, s) -s]dG
{s E U, w0 (s),w1(c, s) }
1
- JcLf(Es)dG
where A =IEfw1(c,s) ￿ max[ctf(c, s) -c(s)+s,s}} and




We shall impose the usual regularity conditions on f(E, s). That is for
each ,f(c,s) will be assumed to be increasing and concave in s
[f'(E, s) >0, f''(E, s) <0,while f"(c, s)is assumed to be bounded.- 10-
(Theregularity conditions are required for the existence of a unique
optimum s, but not for our derivation of the optimum contract.)
II. OPTIMUM LABOR POLICIES
Semiconductor firms attract and reward valuable employees not
so much by offering high salaries as by giving stock options.
Braun and MacDonald (1978, p. 132)
Proposition I provides the solution to Problem A.
Proposi-lion 1: An optimum labor policy for Problem A consists of the
labor contract
s) =max{af(c,s) -c(s) +s,s} for all LER
w*(s) =s-![w+(c, s) -s]dG=s-I[f(c, s) -c(s)]dG
A*
[where A R and A*{ckf(c, s) —c(s)>0)1,and the unique skill level,
s, which satisfies Rff'(c, s*)dG =1(if no such s* E U exists, the
optimum s is at one of the boundaries, 0 or
Proof: It is helpful to construct the proof of this proposition in two
parts; first showing that {w(s), w(c, s)} provides an optimum labor
contractnomatterwhat s is chosen, and then showing that s is indeed
optimal.
We assume, to the contrary, that there exists an s, say s, and
a feasible labor contract )} such that
ll{, i(c, )} > ll{, w*(), )}, and then show that this
involves a contradiction. Since f(), (c, )} must satisfy (A.1);— 11—
() ? 2_AJ1(E,)dG-J[ctf(,) -c()+]dG- 5dG,with
A and defined as in Problem A. Substituting this expression into the
profit function and comparing it with the profits that would be earned as
a result of {w), )}, we have ll{, (€, )} -
ll{,w(), w*(, )] =—Jc()dG
0, a contradiction.
Given that Iw(s), w'(E, s)} is optimal, Q* =0(the null set)
and w(s) s -f[wr(c,s) -s}dG.Substituting these expressions into
A*
the profit function we find that the firm's problem is reduced to choosing
an s E U which niaximizes RJE, s)dG -s.Clearly, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a maximum for this problem are obtained at s
as defined above. LI
It is worth noting that though there is a unique s there are many
labor contracts which will maximize profits. In fact, all we require for
a contract to be optimal is that the bonus payment be such that it never
induces a scientist of skill level s to set up a rival, and that the
flat rate be the minimum acceptable rate (satisfying A.l) given the
structure of the bonus. More formally, we have
Corollary 2.1: Any labor policy consisting of s and a labor contract
satisfying w1(E, *) af(, s*) -c(s*)+5*(forall EA*) and
w0(s*) +AJ[Wl(,*) _s*JdG=swill be optimal for Problem A.
The project will always generate more net revenues if there is one
firm monopolizing its output than if there are two rivals. The
entrepreneur can ensure both that the rival never appears and that the
expected costs of hiring the scientist do not exceed his alternative wage,
by setting a highenoughw1 (€, s*) and lowering w0 (s*) appropriately.- 12-
Byproceeding in this manner the entrepreneur gains the maximum expected
rents that could accrue to the scarce factor, that is, to the entrepreneur's
idea.
Of the contracts satisfying Corollary 1.1, we emphasize
fw'(s), w'(, s)} for two reasons; first, it is exceedingly easy to
implement. The hiring agreement need only specify that during the second
period the scientist will be offered, in addition to his alternativewage,
a stock option. The stock option specifies that if the scientist decides
to stay with the firm in the second period he will be allowed topurchase,
at a cost of c(s), a fraction c of the firm's equity.6 Of course the
offer of a profit-sharing scheme of the formw1(c, s) =f(c,s) +s,
with max[af(c, s) -c(s)]/f(,s) and with w0(s) as defined in the cER
corollary, will do equally well. In fact, a stock-option (or profit-
sharing) scheme of this form will be optimal for arbitrary gain [p(s, s)]
and loss [9(c,s)]functions provided that ? max p(, s)/f(, s) ER
[there may be some advantage in setting ￿ max(, s)/p(E, s),
LER
for then the scientist has no bargainingcounter after the realization of
c]. The second, and perhaps more important,reason for emphasizing stock-
option agreements is that they tie the second-periodpayment to the
scientist directly to the fortunes of the firm--thatis, the realization
of s--and to those aspects of the structure of theindustry that
determine the gains and losses that would result fromsetting up a rival
[here, ci.and c(s)]. As we shall see, once onecomplicates Problem A
6 This ofcourse assumes that the project is financed by the issueof
equity and that the stock market provides a reasonable
approximation
of the value of the project. Note that ifaf(c, s) -c(s)< 0 it
does not matter whether the scientiststays with the firm or engages
in some other activity.- 13-
eitherby adding additional constraints or by changing the economics of
the research and marketing processes in a substantive way, the set of
optimum contracts narrows but they must always have these characteristics.
In fact they are the characteristics that distinguish contracts for
research personnel from contracts designed to deal with otherproblems of
employer-employee relationships that may arise (which explains the
quotation at the beginning of this section).7
Proposition 1 implies that the entrepreneur can maximize expected
profits by following a simple two-stage decision procedure. First choose
s to maximize expected profits, ignoring the fact that the scientist may
be able to use the information he acquires on the project to set up a
rival; then choose a labor contract that ensures both that a rival never
appears and that the expected costs of employing the scientist just equal
his alternative wage. There will always exist a particularly simple labor
contract consisting of a flat rate and a profit-sharing scheme which
satisfies these conditions. Note that this implies that, provided all
agents behave optimally, input decisions (s), and the expected
profitability of research projects are independent of the institutional,
market, and technological conditions which determine the gains and the
'Aninteresting literature is developing on the characteristics of
employer-employee contracts that deals with an assortment of agency
problems including monitoring of on-the-job effort, the allocation of
uncertainty, and the unravelling of unobserved characteristics (see,
among others, Stiglitz, 1975, Akerloff, 1976, Salop and Salop, 1976,
Nickell, 1976, Mortensen, 1978, Lazear, 1979, and Lazear and Rosen,
1981). Each of these problems is of course likely to have some effect
on contracts for research staff. However, so far as we can tell, none
of them in themselves induce payment schemes with the characteristics
discussed above.- 14-
lossesagentswould incur if a rival were set up. That is, the potential
mobility of scientific personnel affects neither the profitability of
research projects nor employment in them. As noted, these conclusions are
not altered if we replace the particular gain and loss functions used here
with arbitrary ones satisfying the basic condition that p(, s) s)
for all s E R. Nor will they change if one allows for the fact that many
different factors of production are typically used in research projects
( 11 -h,-.,.1,1 1- S •. _LIII_i II . %.aJ t a ti SIIj) LI I.._fI_ta1 IL S L S- .IflJI_L .L.¼1US.'S.'IL%J.J 5.11 5Jns.a.n.S.IIS1.' S.
expectedprofits ignoring the possibility that a rival will appear).8
8Inparticular, the entrepreneur will never be induced to substitute
any other factor for skill beyond the point where the ratio of the
expected marginal products of all factors equals the ratio of their
costs; regardless, of course, of whether an increase in skill decreases
the cost of setting up a rival. The problem does get more complicated
in situations where it may be profitable to hire more than one
scientist who will (at the end of the first period) possess information
which enables them to set up a rival. The reason is that the gains
any one of the scientists would make from setting up a rival may, in
this case, depend on the behavior of the others. Provided the total
gains from setting up a rival are always less than the entrepreneur's
losses and that constraints analogous to (A.1) continue to hold, the
solution does not, however, differ substantively. The entrepreneur
ought still to ensure that a rival never appears by paying each
scientist a high enough bonus (say higher than the maximum gain he
could make as a result of a rival appearing), to lower the initial wage
as much as possible, and thus to ensure that he (the entrepreneur)
garners all the expected net revenues from the project other than the
scientists' alternative cost. Of course, for many (usually all but
one or two) of the individuals working on a research project these
considerations are irrelevant. Most personnel do not work on tasks
enabling them to gather information of much value to a rival.- 15-
Thereare two implications of this section which may be somewhat
surprising. First, entrepreneurs need not be averse to the mobility of
scientific personnel; second, provided all agents act optimally, we should
not observe a scientist breaking away from an established firm tojoin or
set up a rival. The next two sections investigate the robustness of these
findings to certain changes in the assumptions underlying the model.
Section III considers situations in which labor contracts of the formgiven
in Corollary 1.1 are not feasible; while Section IV considers situations
in which a different descr:iption of the research and marketingprocess is
relevant.
III. NON-NEGATIVE LABOR CONTRACTS
The conclusions of the last section rest on the assumption that one can
always implement a labor contract which satisfies the conditions that
w(€, s) ￿ af(c, s) -c(s)+sfor all EA* and w0(s) =s-
AJ[wl(€,s) -s]dGwhere A* ={Ejrjf(,s) -c(s)o}. Clearly, if the
project has some probability of generating large net revenues, or if a is
large while c(s) is small, these conditions may require w0(s) to be
very small or negative. Since either convention or legal restrictions
(minimum-wage laws) may constrain w0(s) to be above some minimum value
(which we take for simplicity to he zero), the question which arises is
how the conclusions of the last section are changed if, in addition to
the feasibility constraint (A.l), a labor policy must also satisfy the
non-negativity constraint
(A.2) w(s) ￿ 0- 16-
Forany particular s it may now be impossible for the entrepreneur
to ensure both that a rival does not appear and that the expected payments
to the scientist just equals his alternative wage. In this case then the
profitability of the project and the choice of research inputs may depend
on the factors that determine the gains and losses that would occur if the
scientist did set up a rival. On the other hand, provided all agents act
optimally, the scientist will still never be induced to set up the rival.
These assertions follow from Proposition 2 and its corollaries.
Proposition 2:If constraint (A.2) is added to Problem A, then, no matter
what the choice of s,the contract {w(s), w(E, s)} will be optimal
where





Since w(c, s) = s) for all ER the stock-option agreement
will still be optimal. However, if the expected gains from the stock
option are now greater than the scientist's market wage [6(s) < 0],
the entrepreneur sets the flat rate at zero and pays the scientist more
than 2s. Note that the entrepreneur ought never to induce a scientist
to set up a rival, that is Q =
Proof:We first show that for any contract {(s), s)} satisfying
(A.l) and (A.2) to he optimal, Q must equal the null set. We then show
that of all contracts satisfying Q =0and (A.l)-(A.2), {w(s), w(c, s)}- 17-
isthe optimum. Thus consider comparing the expected profits from the
contract {0(s), s)} to those from {(s), w(c, s)} where
i0(s) =0(s)+ AJ[wl(E, s) -w(E,s)]dG. Note that if {0(s), jc, s)}
satisfies (A.1)-(A.2) so does {0(s), s)} [1(E, s) > the pay-offs
to the scientist under the latter contract for E E A, while w(E, s) ￿
the pay-offs to the scientist under the former for R -A]. Ondirect
substitution into the profit function we have ll{s, (s), s)} -
ll{s,0(s), w(c, s)} =-J[w(6,s) -s]dG
-öJaf(.
s)dG +
J[w(E, s) -sJdG=-4c(s)dG￿ 0, where the last equality follows from
1
Q
thefact that A* + -0[0 ={ccE A and EA)], and
w(c, s) =sfor E€D. Thus we restrict our discussion to contracts
which result in Q= 0 whichimplies that 1(E, s) -s￿ ctf(c, s) -c(s)
for all EA*. Among these contracts the feasibility condition implies
that (s) ￿ s-J[r(c,s) -s}dG,from which it follows that for A* 1
given s expected profits must be less than equal to the number
ll(s) RJE, s)dG -s[111(s) would be the optimum profit if there
were no non—negativity constraint, see Proposition 1]. On the other hand,
since(c, s) -s?cLf(c, s) -c(s)for all A*, the non-negativity
constraint implies that expected profits must be less than or equal to
=Rff(E,s)dG -J[ctf(c,s) -c(s)]dG would be the optimum
A*
profit level if there were no feasibility constraint, i.e., if expected
payments to the employee could be made as small as we like provided that
w0(s) ￿ 0]. But H[s, w(s), w(e, s)] =min[111(s),112(5)]. []
Note that though the non-negativity constraint should not produce a
situation in which we actually observe a scientist settingup a rival, it
may cause the expected profitability of the research project and research- 18-
employmentto differ from what they would be if the entrepreneur were to
choose s by maximizing expected profits while ignoring the possibility
of a rival appearing, that is, if he chose s of the preceding section.
[Clearly, a necessary condition for this is that 5(s4) <0;otherwise
the policy {s*, w(s*), w(c, s*)} will satisfy (A.2) as well as (A.l).]
Figure 1 illustrates this point by providing the optimum profit and
research employment (H and s) for this problem when c(s) =c0
+c1s
[c(s) ￿ 0 for all s E U]. In the figurea4 is that level of a which
solves 6(s*) =0.Three cases are distinguished. In case 1,c1 ￿ 0
or Lcj is small; in case 3, c1 <0and c1 is large; and in case 2,
c1 <0and ci is in some intermediate range. Clearly increases in
a to the left of a will not affect eithers or if4,and,as one
might expect from Schumpeterian arguments, increases in a to the right
of a+ can only decrease ll(a similar argument, also following directly
from Proposition 2, can be made regarding decreases in c1). More
surprising is that though profits decrease as a result of increasesin
a (decreases in c1) the skill level need not. For example, provided
c1 ￿ 0 or 1c11is small (case 1) s will always be greater than s
and s4 will increase with a. More formally, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.1: Assume c1 >0and define N4 ={sls
5(s) ￿0}U .Thens4 =minssubject to s E N.
S(s*) ￿ 0, constraint (A.2) is superfluous ands4 =
s￿ s ￿ that satisfies s(s) ￿0,then s =
ofs). If S(s*) <0and 5(i)0, then s4 is
contained in N4 that satisfies 6(s) =0,since
increasing function of sfor s?S*. Clearly, s4
￿ s and
That is, if












































ina, i.e., s/a 2 0 (see Figure 1).
Proof: From Proposition 2, s is that value of s which satisfies
max[minll1(s), 112(s)}}. Note that S(s) =112(s) -H1(s), andthat ll(s) ￿0
sEU
for all sU while is concave and has a maximum at s. Thus
if (s*) 2 0, H(*) is attainable [￿ll2(s)] and since
ll(s*) ￿ 111(s) for all sU, s =sIf (s*) < 0 while 5() > 0,
then, since S'(s) > 0 for all s(s*, ),thereexists a unique s,
say (s*, ),with5()0. For s ,111(s)ll(), while for
￿ H(), which proves that in this case s =. Finally,
if S() ￿ 0, then is attainable [￿fl1()] and since
ll2() 2 112(5)for all sU, 5=. []
Itmay be helpful to consider the intuition behind this result. Say
S(s*) < 0. Then at s the marginal increase in costs from increasing
skill equals the increase in the expected bonus, which is just a fraction
a of the increase in benefits. This will be true for any s ￿ s < s.
+ ... . . . . Atsthe feasibility constraint becomes binding and the increase in
costs that results from a further increase in skill jumps discretely to
unity. Since s > s, and f(., •)isconcave in s, the marginal
increase in benefits at s, i.e., RJfs(6, s)dG, is less than unity.
Hence increases in s beyond s increase costs more than expected
benefits. (The proofs for the second and third cases in the diagram are
slightly more complicated. They follow from the fact that c1 < 0 implies
that H(s) is concave in s.)
There is here a point worth emphasizing. Although the institutional
and technological factors which determine the gains and the losses that
would result if the scientist sets up a rival may affect the allocation of- 21-
resourcesto research if certain reasonable (non-negativity) constraints
are placed on labor contracts, a more protective environment does not
necessarily induce more research expenditures. If, for example, the
proportion of revenues the scientist would derive by setting up a rival
were independent of his skill level, any increase in this proportion should
induce more expenditures on skill.9'10
The other implication of this section which should be stressed is
that non-negativity constraints on labor contracts ought not, in themselves,
lead to scientists actually breaking away from their employers to setup
rivals. Thus, if we are looking for the conditions that may induce them
to do so, we should probably examine the economics of the research and
marketing processes themselves more closely. This is the topic of the
next section.
9Barzel (1968) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) have shown that research
expenditures will tend to be higher in a world where many individuals
possess the idea underlying the research project than in a world where
one individual monopolizes the idea. In this section we have assumed
that initially only one individual has the idea and have considered
changes in the environment whichallowmore or less protection to the
resulting innovations. See also the discussion of the next section.
10Note also that if constraint (A.2) is binding at s', theoptimum
contract is unique (this contrasts with the situation when there is no
non-negativity contraint; see the discussion of the preceding section).
In this case the optimum labor policy will be more closely related to
the precise assumptions underlying the model. For example, with the
assumptions used here, fl(s) ￿ 0 if rI(s*) ￿ 0.If we had allowed
for a fixed start-up cost of engaging in the project (say the cost of
a laboratory), then fl(s) could be negative, in which case the
solutions provided in the diagram would only be appropriate if rI(s) ? 0.
If H(s) is negative the project will not be undertaken.— 22—
IV.QUITS AND THE E5TALISHMENT OF 'RIVALS'
Mobility within the semiconductor industry has been aided by
the very tolerant attitude of most firms towards movement of
personnel.
Braun and MacDonald (1978, p. 135)
Though it may well be true that in most science—based industries one seldom
observes a scientist breaking away from his employer to set up a rival,
there is at least one industry, the semiconductor industry, where this has
happened quite often.'1 Indeed many studies of the structure of the
semiconductor industry begin by constructing a 'family tree' of firms that
were offshoots from each other (see, for example, Freeman, 1974, pp. 147-
49). Clearly to accommodate this phenomenon in our framework, we will
have to modify the assumptions underlying our model. In this context,
the crucial assumption of the preceding sections is that p(E, s) ￿ 2.(e, s)
for all cR. That is, optimum behavior by all agents will not induce
the scientist to set up a rival if he believes that he will thereby gain less
than what the entrepreneur believes he (the entrepreneur) has to lose.
On the other hand, one can show (see below, p. 30) that if there are
possible outcomes in which p(c, s) > s),optimum behavior may
induce the establishment of a rival. There are, therefore, at least
two questions of interest. First, when would we expect such outcomes
One would need a very detailed history of an industry to determine that
it does not exhibit this phenomenon. On the other hand, many science-
based industries seem to operate with a fairly stable number of firms;
see Temin (1979) on the drug industry since World War II, Phillips
(1974) on the aircraft industry, and Freeman's (1974) description of
the synthetic materials industry after World War I.- 23-
tooccur? Second, how do they affect project profitability and research
employment? This section discusses two sets of conditions which have the
potential of actually inducing the scientist to set up a rival. In both,
the actions of all agents are a result of optimum behavior based on
correct inforniation.'2 Moreover, these conditions are not unlike those
which have developed in the semiconductor industry. Our discuccion will
focus on their implications for project profitability and on optimum labor
policies, leaving several interesting questions concerning the environments
which generate these conditions for subsequent work. In particular it
will be shown that, provided the entrepreneur uses an optimum labor
contract, he need not be troubled by the possibility that scientific
personnel may move. In fact, all else equal, the entrepreneur should
prefer situations in which it is relatively easy for the scientist to do
so.
Third-partyentrants
SectionsI to III have assumed that the entrepreneur and the scientist
whom he employs jointly retain perfect monopoly power over the information
produced during the research project. There are, however, several ways
in which third parties might gain access to this information. The output
12 Ofcourse, the scientist may wrongly believe that p(c, s) > R(e, s);
or the entrepreneur may err in his evaluation of £(c, s). Provided
one precisely specifies the entrepreneur's information on p(c, s)
in the first period, this case can be analysed in a model similar
to those developed below and it has the same qualitative implications
on project profitability and research employment.- 24-
ofthe project may spread as a result of inspection of either the product
in which it is embodied or the patents resulting from the project (indeed
patents would not exist if there were no possibility of third party entrants),
or a third party may complete a similar research project after the leading
firm. If there is a possibility of third party entrants the entrepreneur's
optimum stategy will take into account his beliefs on how third parties
are likely to act (for a formal model of entrepreneurial behavior in a
related context, see Gaskins, 1971). This optimum strategy will include
a labor policy. Clearly, however, if there are potential third party
entrants, the logic that led us to the optimum labor policies of the
preceding sections is no longer appropriate. There the argument was that
since the benefits that would accrue to the scientist from setting up a
rival were smaller than the consequent losses of the firm, the entrepreneur
would always devise a contract deterring the scientist from setting up
the rival. If other agents have access to the information, however, then
the scientist, by setting up a rival, may also be able to break into
profits that would otherwise accrue to third parties. In this case, both
the scientist and the entrepreneur may be able to gain, if the scientist
can set up a rival.
To analyse this situation we must add some notation. Again f(c, s)
represents the net revenues that would accrue to the entrepreneur if the
scientist did not set up a rival (given the expected behavior of third
parties). If the scientist does set up a rival, the pay-offs to
entrepreneur, scientist, and third parties all change. For simplicity,
we maintain the assumption that if the scientist does set up a rival,
the entrepreneur loses a fraction c of the net revenues [to allow for
the possibility that his revenues actually increase we permit ci. <0in- 25-
thissection, though we continue to refer to cf(c, s) as the
entrepreneur's losses]; and that the costs of setting up a rival are
c(s). Depending on the realization of c, on technological and market
conditions, and on the oligopolistic strategies pursued by the agents,
part of the losses incurred by the firm may now go to agents other than
the entrepreneur and the scientist (to the third parties or to consumers);
alternatively, by setting up a rival, the scientist may be able to break
into the net revenues that would otherwise accrue to the third parties.
Accordingly, in this section we assume that the gains that would
accrue to the scientist if he set up a rival are af(, s) -c(s)+
s+r(,s), where the only restriction placed onr(E, s)j is
that it be finite for all ER [r(E, s) has a finite
support]. 1 3
At the end of the first period the scientist will be induced to set
up a rival if this is the best of the three alternatives available to him,
that is, if cLf(c, s) -c(s)+ s +r(E,s) > w1(c, s)and af(, s) -
c(s)+s+r(,s) > s. He will stay with the firm if the first inequality
is reversed and w1(E, s) ￿s; while if neither of these two conditions
is met he will return to the labor market and engage in some other activity.
Given the scientist's decision rules (and assuming contracts are
unbounded), the entrepreneur's expected profit-maximization problem is
given by Problem B.
13 Here r(c, s) can he interpreted as the revenues extracted from (or
lost to) third parties (or possibly consumers). It is not difficult
to work out examples where its value can be either positive or negative
depending on the realization of E and other parameters of the problem.- 26-
ProblemB
max II =Jf(,s)dG
-w(s) -f[w(, s) -s]dG
-
{sEU, w0(s), w(, s) r
QScf(E s)dG
r
where Ar ={Ew1(E,s) ￿ max[af(E, s) -c(s)+s+r(c,s), s}and
= s) -c(s)+S+r(C,s) > max[w1(E, s), s]}, subject to




Proposition 3 underlies most of the discussion in this section.
Proposilion 3:Regardless of the choice of s, an optimum labor contract
for Problem B is
w(E, s) =max{csf(E,s) +s,s}
w(s) =2s- s)-c(s)+s+r(6,s)]dG -
5w (c, s)dG
R- Q*
where Q* ={€jr(c,s) -c(s)> 0 and af(E, s) -c(s)+r(c,s) > 0}.
Verbally, the bonus scheme is implemented by the entrepreneur offering the
scientist a profit-sharing agreement plus his alternative wage. The share
is the fraction of the firm's net revenues the scientist would take away
if he were to set up a rival. The scientist only accepts the profit-
sharing agreement if cf(c, s) > 0. The initial wage is the minimum flat- 27-
wageacceptable, given that the scientist will receive w(6, s) if
£ E A*, and cf(E, s) -c(s)+ s + r(E, s) if 6 E Q.
Proof: To prove this proposition we assume, to the contrary, that there
exists an s, say ,anda feasible contract {(), )}
such that H{, )} > fl{, w), w(6, )} and then show
that this involves a contradiction. Since {(), )} must
satisfy (B.l), j) ? 2 -AJl(E,)dG -J[af(E,
) -c()++r(s, )]dG-
JdG where r ={E!cf(6,) c() + +r(, ) > max{1(6, ), ]}.
R-A -Qr r
Substituting this condition and the optimum labor contract into the
-- - r— r - definitionof 11 we have ll{s, w0(s), w1(, s)} -ll{s,w0(s), w1(s, s)} <
J[r(6, ) -c()]dG-QJ[r(E) -c()]dG￿ 0, a contradiction. To
r
prove the last inequality let Q be the set of all subsets of the set
M={6lcf(c,)-c()+ r(C, )o}. Clearly, and Q
maximizes QJ{r(E) ) -c()]dG(over Q Q). [I
Since the scientist can always return to the labor market and earn
his alternative wage, he will not set up a rival unless Of(6, s) -c(s)+
r(c, s) > 0. Now consider those realizations of £ where this condition
is satisfied. If af(c, s) -c(s)+ r(6, s) > cf(E, s), the entrepreneur
would have to pay the scientist more in order to induce him to stay than
the entrepreneur would lose if the scientist set up a rival. For those
realizations of 6, then, it will pay the entrepreneur to allow the
employee to leave. The bonus scheme w(6, s) will induce precisely this
behavior.
To derive the optimum skill level for Problem B we require additional
assumptions on T(s) —Q+I[r(61 s) -c(s)]dG,which is likely to increase
in s, since one would expect r(6, s)0 and c'(s) 0.If in- 28
addition we assume that T(s) is concave for all s [or at least not
sufficiently convex to offset the concavity of RSCs)dG)]and that
T(s) is bounded, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2: If there exists an s'U which satisfies RJfS(C, sr)dG +
5[r(c,Sr) -c(s')]dG
=1,then 5r is the optimum skill level
for Problem B. Otherwise the optimum s is at one of the boundaries, 0
or s.
Proof: Substituting {w(s), W(E, s) }intothe equation for II in
Problem B we obtain il(s) =RfE)
s)dG -s+5 [r(E,s) -c(s)]dG.
Q*(s)
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to s and setting
it equal to zero we obtain s as defined above.lk [11
Thesum of the entrepreneur's and scientist's gains from setting up
a rival is r(6, s) -c(s),and Q(s) is the set of all for which
this sum is positive, and for which the scientist, if he quits, would
actually set up the rival (rather than engage in some other activity).
By using a labor contract which induces the scientist to set up a rival
if c E Q(s), and then setting the flat wage at the minimum acceptable
given optimum behavior by the scientist, the entrepreneur ensures that
J
' To see this partition Q*(s) into J subsets, i.e., Q*(s) =Eq.(s), r r
where q(s) ={ElK0(s)
<< K(s)} .Thenfl(s) =Rf's)dG -
JK.(S)
S +5K5)[r(E,s)-c(s)]dG.Noting that the value of the integrand
3=1 OJ'
at both its upper and lower limits for each of the J groups is zero
we obtain the derivative in the corollary (see Kolmogorov and Fomin,
1970, Section 31.3).- 29-
hisexpected gain includes the maximum expected gain that could possibly
arise as a result of the mobility of scientific personnel [T(s)]. The
entrepreneur will choose s to maximize thse gains plus R'"' s)dG -s.
All else equal, then, the entrepreneur ought clearly to prefer environments
in which it is easier for the scientist to set up a rival and where the
scientist can earn larger profits from the rival.
Finally, from the definition of Q*(5r)we have Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.2: Given optimum behavior of all agents, the necessary and
sufficient condition for quits and the establishment of rivals to be
possible is that r(E, Sr) -c(sr)> 0 and af(s, S'S) +r(E 5r) -
c(sr)> 0 for some c with positive probability.
Thus, one should observe scientists setting up rivals when set-up
costs are low and when other agents (third parties) are likely to enter
similar activities. Indeed, one would expect these two conditions to be
mutually supportive, i.e., low set-up costs may induce third-party entrants,
while third-party entrants may attract venture capital to the particular
field of activity (see the description of the evolution of Santa Clara or
'Silicon' Valley in Bylinsky, 1976, Chapter 4).
To summarize: it is clear that the inability of the firm to maintain
perfect monopoly power over its discoveries may induce third party entrants,
thereby creating conditions which result in the scientist breaking away
from the entrepreneur to set up a new enterprise. Nonetheless, the
mobility of scientific personnel is not, in itself, a source of concern
to entrepreneurs. Indeed an optimum labor contract ensures that the
scientist will only set up a new enterprise when it would help the
entrepreneur to gain some of the revenues that would otherwise accrue to- 30-
thirdparties.
Spin—offs
One way of stating the general result underlying the discussion of this
section is that an optimum labor contract has the potential of inducing
the scientist to set up a rival if there are possible states of nature in
which the establishment of the rival increases the sum of the returns accruing to the
two agents involved in the project.'5 The classic economic reason for
total profits to increase when two firms (rather than one) engage in an
activity is increasing costs (here interpreted to include the costs of
gathering and processing information; see the review by Spence, 1975, and
more recently, Keren and Levhari, 1981, and Rosen, 1981). There is one
characteristic of research projects which deserves emphasis in this context.
Research projects, especially those in relatively young science-based
industries, often produce multiple outputs, that is, discoveries leading
to several different innovations, some of which are only marginally related
to the project's original goals.'6 In cases with multiple discoveries
'Whatis required is that there exist possible states of nature in which
p(, s) -2(e,s) >0andp(,s) >0.For the case of arbitrary
gain and loss functions an optimum contract is: s) =




where Qg{EIp(, s) - s) >0and p(, s) >0)9The set
Qg is the set of realizations of which induce the scientist to set
up a rival and, provided that it is non-negligible [i.e., prob(cEQ8) 0J,
there is the possibility of a rival appearing. An entrepreneur who
uses this contract will be led to choose s to maxRff(c, s)dG +
gJ[P(
s) -(E, s)]dG-s. sEU
16Q(s)
See, e.g., the discussion in Nelson (1959). Mueller's (1962) study of
the origin of Du Pont's major innovations lists nine of them as- 31-
therewill, in general, be costs and benefits associated with the
coordination of subsequent financial, development, and marketing decisions.
The particular aspects of the process worth coordinating may be best served
by different organizational structures (the possibilities include, in
addition to the formation of a separate enterprise, the establishment of a
holding company, and the setting up of separate research and production
departments within a given firm); which one is economic will depend on
technological, market, and (particularly when antitrust laws are a factor)
institutional considerations.
To incorporate these issues into our framework, consider a model in
which the research project can result in two types of discoveries; those
related to its original objectives the('innovation'), and those that are
not (the 'spin-off'). 17 Assume, for simplicity, that only the scientist
has direct access to the spin-off. Clearly, an entrepreneur working in
such an environment will have an incentive to devise contracts which will
induce the scientist to reveal the spin-off if it is in the entrepreneur's
interest for him to do so. However, it might be more profitable to
produce the spin-off in a rival firm; and in that event, the entrepreneur
may have to pay more in order to induce the scientist to reveal the spin-off
originating in Du Pont's own laboratory and of these, two (the
discoveries of teflon and of ducose lacquers) resulted from research
accidents. Of course, a new application of a given discovery would
also result in a different innovation. See in particular the historical
discussion in Rosenberg (1963 and 1969).
17
In this subsection we make do with a verbal description of the model
and the results. The technicalities are similar to those in the
preceding subsection (see also note 15).- 32-
thanit is worth if utilized in the original firm.It is in such a case
that optimum behavior by all agents results in the scientist setting up
a rival. To complete the model, assume, as in the preceding sections,
that if the scientist does set up a rival he takes with him a share a of
the net revenues from the innovation, and that the costs of setting up a
rival are c(s).'8 It can then be shown that entrepreneurs using an
optimum contract will offer a second-period bonus consisting of two
profit-sharing schemes: a share a of the net revenues from the innovation,
and the entire net revenue generated by the spin-off. With this bonus
offer the scientist will only set up a rival if he expects the difference
between the net revenue generated by the spin-off when utilized in a
separate firm and that generated when it is utilized in the original firm
to be greater than the cost of setting up the separate firm. Further, an
optimizing entrepreneur will choose s to maximize all the expected net
revenues from the project (those from the innovation as well as from the
spin-off) and will, all else equal, prefer situations in which it is less
costly and more profitable for scientists to set up their own enterprise.
These latter points follow because scientists who work in industries where
spin-offs do occur realize that by joining a project they will gather
information which may allow them to profit in their own enterprise in the
future, and are therefore willing to lower their initial wage accordingly.
18 Aparticularly relevant case is a =0.In this case, if the rival is
set up, one firm produces the original innovation and the other produces
the spin-off. There is a set of interesting questions regarding the
determination of the gains and losses that result from a rival being
set up. Here we do no more than take as given whatever functions are
determined and consider their implications for optimum labor policies.- 33-
V.SUMMARY
Thebasic conclusion of this paper is that providedentrepreneurs act
optimally and are not limited in their choice of labor contract, the
potential mobility of scientific personnel will not have an adverse effect
on the profitability of research projects. If, on the other hand, either
convention or legal restrictions place a lower bound on the flatrate to
be paid to scientists (if, for example,w0 is constrained to be non-
negative) and if the project has some probability of being highlyproductive,
then our conclusion needs to be modified. However,though bounded contracts
may induce a situation in which the potential mobility of scientific
personnel has an adverse effect on project profitability, it does not
necessarily induce lower research employment, nor can bounds on contracts
in themselves generate situations in which weactually observe a scientist
quitting in order to join (or set up) a rival.
The conclusion regarding the effects of the mobility of scientific
personnel follows from the fact that an optimizing entrepreneur who is
free to choose among alternative contracts will always chooseone which
only induces the scientist to leave and join a rival if the sum of the
benefits to the two agents increases as a result of the scientist's
leaving. Contracts which specify labor payments in the form of a combination
of flat wage rate and stock option (or otherprofit-sharing agreement)
ought to he able to induce a close approximation to this behavior. Given
the expected value of the profit-sharing agreement, theentrepreneur should
set the initial wage,w0, to a level which is low enough to ensure that
the total of the expected payments to the scientist isjust equal to the
scientist's alternative wage. The expected profits of anentrepreneur- 34-
whofollows this policy will include all the monetary gains expected to
accrue to either of the two agents other than the scientist's alternative
wage. That is, the entrepreneur extracts all possible rents accruing to
the idea underlying the project.
Clearly, then, if the sum of the benefits to the two agents cannot be
increased by the scientist's leaving, the entrepreneur should specify a
contract which will never induce him to do so. In this case the best the
4,, 11 ,, c,I1I 1. IJ)L'_,ILI (AL La,I LII)A. ..)LI''...IIL)IJOI.a.,..1..L a¼. LJSLJnAtal..SiSLA..t, I.,LItLI ¼..fJI.. I.. I.. ¼..LL
profitabilityof the research project, ignoring the possibility of quits,
and then to choose a labor contract which ensures that quits will never
occur. It followsthat project profitability and research employment will
be independent of the technological, market, and institutional factors
which determine the gains the scientist would make from setting up a rival.
On the other hand, if there are possible outcomes from the research project
in which the sum of the monetary benefits to the two agents can be increased
by the scientist leaving, the entrepreneur ought to choose a contract which
will induce the scientist to leave if such an outcome materializes. In
this case, the entrepreneur's expected profits will never be adversely
affected by conditions which enable the scientist to earn more by setting
up a rival; and they will actually increase with the expected gains of the
scientist fromsettingup a rival provided those gains are not simply a
transfer of funds from the entrepreneur to the scientist.
We have focused on two characteristics of research projects which
could lead to situations in which optimum behavior by all agents would
result in the scientist breaking away from his employer to establish a
rival. First, it may be possible for third parties to gain access to the
information generated from the project, in which case the scientist's- 35-
settingup a rival may enable the entrepreneur to recoup some of the profits
that would otherwise accrue to third parties. Second, the research project
may lead to several discoveries, in which case costs of coordination may
result in its being economic to develop and market theni in separate
enterprises.In either of these cases an optimizing entrepreneur will be
led to make research employment decisions to maximize all the profits to
be generated by the project, whether the associated net revenues accrue
to the rival or the original firm.
In short, though we are quite sure that there are mechanisms which,
because of the fact that they can be used to spread the information
produced in a firm's research laboratories, reduce the profitability of
research projects and (perhaps) of employment in them, the potential
mobility of scientific personnel need not be one of them. The reason is
straightforward. Provided the firm is free to choose among alternative
labor contracts it can provide an incentive structure which controls the
mobility of the scientist--only inducing him to leave and set up a rival
when it is in the firm's interest for him to do so.36 -
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